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The degree of familiarity with threats is considered as a 
predictor of Internet attitudes and security behaviors. Cross-
sectional data were collected from 323 student participants 
using an online survey, with 169 participants located in the 
USA and 154 in the UK. Several analyses were conducted. 
Cluster analysis to examine familiarity with threats and 
everyday Internet behaviors. This was followed by 
mediation analysis to examine the link between time spend 
on the Internet and Internet experience as indirect predictors 
of the security precautions taken. This relationship was 
predicted to be mediated by familiarity with threats and 
Internet behaviors. 
The results showed the following. First, we found 
significant differences in familiarity between the national 
samples in relation to social engineering and phishing. 
Cluster analysis identified three distinct groups: the experts 
(cluster 1; n = 103) who were very familiar with the 16 
threats and 2 everyday Internet behaviors, clusters 2 and 3 
(n = 90) who were less familiar with recent threats, and 
others who were less familiar with established threats (n = 
98). The two clusters composed of participants who were 
less familiar with threats, were also significantly less likely 
to use security features on their computer to protect 
themselves from threats in comparison to experts. Security 
actions included the use of anti-virus, firewall, anti-
spyware, and the use of software and security updates.  
Second, time spent on the Internet and the length of Internet 
experience were significant predictors of familiarity and 
significant indirect predictors of security behaviors 
behaviours (suggesting a relationship fully mediated by 
familiarity). This means that experience influences threat 
familiarity – and via familiarity – predicts subsequent use 
of security actions. The results suggest two insights. Based 
on the cluster analysis, we note that familiarity may vary 
depending on the type of threat. This may be due to a lack 
of familiarity with threats because these are novel and users 
have not been exposed to them. In other words, while users 
may report they are aware and have knowledge of threats – 
this does mean they are equally familiar with different 
threats and online behaviors. In addition, familiarity may 
account for the relationship between past time and 
experience and subsequent adoption of security.   
On a practical level, the findings have two implications. 
First, awareness may not be as informative as threat-
specific familiarity. Second, since familiarity is an 
important predictor of security action, it may be important 
to consider how familiarity may be increased. Users need to 
know about threats as soon as they emerge in order to 
reduce the initial period of heightened vulnerability.  
Where does this leave IT and those responsible for training? 
We propose that situated learning – learning by doing and 
learning about new threats and tools – may be essential. 
This kind of approach would require users to not only learn 
about threats in an abstract manner (e.g., news bulletins 
from IT), but also through learning-by-doing approaches 
(such as simulated learning exercises). This may allow 
them to see and experience the outcomes of the threat 
(which often stay very abstract) and help them understand 
the role of certain security measures to fight them (in 
scenarios such as simulations). This approach may foster a 
better understanding of how this threat relates to them, 
supporting familiarity and increasing subsequent use of 
security options.                                      
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